

Published in:

Journal of Indian School of Political Economy

**Volume XXI, No 1-4
January-March, 2009,
April-June 2009,
July-September 2009,
October-December 2009**

THE TELANGANA TRAGEDY -

A Lesson in Integration and Disintegration

By

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ABSTRACT

The movement for a separate Telangana state begins in 1968 and culminates in the two elections results of 2004 and 2009. In 2005, the national political parties supported the Telangana case and in late 2009 almost all state political parties and the Union government accepted the proposition. Thereafter as a result of agitation, a Committee was appointed to re-examine the issue and its report was published. This resulted in further controversy. The history of the Telangana movement may be seen as an unsuccessful exercise in integration of regions with different history, disparities in economic development, elites with varying capacities and conflicting goals. The common language has not been able to unite the two regions even after 54 years.

Introduction: Linguistic States in the Republic

The history of linguistic states in India is somewhat uneven with occasional emphasis placed on it in pre-Independence days by votaries for and against the notion. The movement takes shape politically and practically in the early 1950's. The specific issue that precipitated it was the Andhra regions' demand for a state separate from Madras Province.¹ Nehru was forced to concede this when the agitation became a serious law and order problem which he did so with little grace². He, however, then extended the process further by appointing the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC). He issued a caveat against disrupting the traditional diversity of the Hyderabad State which he saw as a successful experiment in combining not only Hindus of three different linguistic backgrounds (Telugu, Marathi and Kananda) who lived largely in three different regions but also Muslims - all under the hegemony the Nizam of Hyderabad.³

On July 2, 1953, Nehru told Chief Ministers that:

So far as we are concerned, we have declared quite clearly that after the Andhra State is well established; we shall appoint a high-powered Commission to consider the question of reorganisation of states in all its many aspects. We do not propose to consider the question of one state separately now. Instead, this cannot be considered because in every such instance many states are concerned.

Nor do we propose to consider this matter on the purely linguistic plane, although language and culture are necessarily important.....I am surprised that suddenly some people should have galvanised themselves into activity in regard to Hyderabad State and demanded its disintegrationI am sorry for this because it denotes an outlook with which I have no sympathy whatever and, which, I am sure, if given free play, would bring utter chaos in a great part of India and lead to other disastrous consequences also.⁴

On the issue of splitting Hyderabad State, Nehru considered it was “injurious to Hyderabad and would upset the whole structure of South India”. “It would”, he added, “be very unwise to do anything that would destroy the administrative continuity that has been achieved in Hyderabad after so much effort”⁵. Finally: “I think it will be extremely undesirable, unfortunate and injurious to Hyderabad”⁶. In response to the Communist Party of India (CPI)-Front demand for disintegration, Nehru stated forthrightly to Chief Ministers on 2nd October 1952:

Then there is the cry for a division of Hyderabad on a linguistic basis. For my part, I am entirely opposed to this. If it is accepted, I am sure it would retard progress in Hyderabad for many long years and would create all manner of problems and upset that balance of South India. All our Five Year Plans and the like will have to be put on the shelf till some new equilibrium is reached.⁷

Ambedkar had mixed feelings. However, his position on linguistic states was reasonably consistent with his earlier position:

We, therefore, want linguistic States for two reasons: to make easy the way to democracy and to remove racial and cultural tension. In seeking to create linguistic States, India is treading the right road. It is the road, which all States have followed. In the case of other linguistic States, they have been so from the very beginning. In the case of India, she has to put herself in the reverse gear to reach the goal. But the road she proposes to travel is well-tried road. It is a road, which is followed by other States.⁸

Yet he was afraid of what he saw as a threat to the unity of the country and to the rights of the minorities. More dominant in his mind was apprehension that “....the Union of India is far, far away, from the United States of India. But this consolidation of the North and balkanisation of the South is not the way to reach it”⁹. He was also fearful of linguistic chauvinism –in this he was prescient.

On Hyderabad and Telangana, as late as 21st December 1955, Nehru told Parliament:

Some honourable members here may well remember that I delivered some speeches in Hyderabad opposing the disintegration of the State of Hyderabad. That was my view. I would still like the State of Hyderabad not to be disintegrated, but circumstances have been too strong for me. I accept them. I cannot force the people of Hyderabad or others to fall in line with my thinking. I accept their decision and I adjust myself to the position that Hyderabad will be disintegrated. The Commission has suggested that if Hyderabad was going to be disintegrated, the Telangana area should remain separate for five years and then decide whether it should merge with the other areas of Andhra. We have no particular objection to that, but logically speaking, it seems to me unwise to allow this matter to be left to argument. Let it be taken up now and let us be done with it¹⁰.

SRC and After

On 16th January 1956, Nehru wrote to Chief Ministers that he had spoken on the radio and Government had issued a communiqué on the SRC recommendations. In the broadcast, he announced that Bombay city would be centrally administered, Vidarbha would be merged with Maharashtra and Saurashtra; and Kutch merged with Gujarat; and also that Hyderabad would be split. The communiqué added that the future of Punjab and the Telangana area of Hyderabad would be decided later. On 14th March 1956, he reported, “it is a happy omen that the difficult and ticklish question of the Punjab has been settled more or less satisfactorily”¹¹. He was wrong as promptly agitation broke out in Punjab, and 220 Members of Parliament opposed the bifurcation of Bombay Province. These issues had to await settlement later.

Summing up the issue of Telangana the SRC had stated that:

It seems to us, therefore, that there is much to be said for the formation of the larger State and nothing should be done to impede the realisation of this goal. At the same time, we have to take note of the important fact that, while opinion in Andhra is overwhelmingly in favour of the larger unit, public opinion in Telangana has still to crystallize itself. Important leaders of public opinion in Andhra themselves seem to appreciate that the unification of Telangana with Andhra, though desirable, should be based on a voluntary and willing association of the people and that it is primarily for the people of Telangana to take a decision about their future¹².

Therefore:

After taking all these factors into consideration we have come to the conclusions that it will be in the interests of Andhra as well as Telangana, if for the present, the Telangana area is to be constituted into a separate State, which may be known as the Hyderabad State with provision for its unification with Andhra after the general elections likely to be held in or about 1961 if by a two thirds majority the legislature of the residual Hyderabad State expresses itself in favour of such unification¹³.

Many of the forebodings of the SRC, which dissuaded it from recommending merger, continued to exist and form the basis of continued unsatisfied demands.

Economic and Political Issues

Despite the linguistic similarities, there were economic, cultural and legacy arguments against merger as stated by the SRC. Throughout recent history, the Telugu people have been divided: the Telangana Telugus had lived for nearly 400 years under Muslim rule while the Andhra Telugus had been ruled for 150 years by the British. Fiscal imbalances between the regions, fears of the Telangana educated class at loss of employment opportunities and the general uncertainty of the Telangana people who had lived under invasion/liberation of the Nizam's State by the Union and consequent military rule for four years (1948-52) - all contributed to a general unease. Even the differences in vocabulary and accents divided and identified the two Telugu populations, as did also their social and other everyday practices¹⁴. All these issues needed sagacious statesmen to sort out and smooth over.

The age-old Muslim aristocracy and the generally hereditary bureaucracy either fled to Pakistan or were very wary of expressing their views or defending their interests. There had been violence against and massacres of Muslims especially in the Marathwara districts of Hyderabad State in the wake of the Indian Army's takeover¹⁵. There was on-going insurrection led by Communist Party, funded and directed from the Andhra, and large parts of Telangana were not under full state control as a result. To blunt the Communist thrust and simultaneously to diminish the power of the feudal class that had supported the Nizam's rule for centuries, the most drastic land reform in the country till date was enacted under military rule¹⁶.

Not only were the *paigahs*, *deshmukhs*, *desais*, *zamindars*, *jagirdars* and *samasthans* – the entire feudal structure - abolished but the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950, gave all tenants property rights and thus undermined the base of the landed class¹⁷. This meant the old elite in Telangana was virtually extinguished as an economic and political class undermined but the new elites had very little time to develop before merger overtook them in 1956. Besides, the Congress Party and Communist Party had been banned in Hyderabad State and political activity was heavily restricted - though elections to the State Assembly were conducted in 1946 under the model of the limited

franchise of Government of India Act, 1935. In Telangana, despite the institution of representative assemblies in the Nizam's Dominions, democracy was not as developed as in Andhra and had only a few years' experience. There had also been minimal activity in the All-India Independence movement. This resulted in a political elite, which was very small, weak and inexperienced lacking in contacts with the All-India networks.

In Andhra, on the other hand, democratic participation under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the Assemblies and the District Boards had empowered the elites there. This was apart from the fact that they had the experience of living under British rule of law, courts and a relatively progressive polity for a hundred years. The Andhra people had participated actively in the Independence movement and their leaders had extensive national experience in Congress Party politics – contributing even a President to it.

With 30% of the vote in Andhra (1955) and 31% in Telangana (1952) in Communist hands was the Congress concerned of the outcome in the coming general election in 1957?¹⁸ After Avadi meeting where the Congress adopted socialism as a credo, Moscow's new friendliness and the experience of defeating the Andhra Communists in 1955, did the Congress think merger would eliminate the Communist threat once and for all from both the states?¹⁹ So, did the party political argument eventually tip the balance?

Merger Announced

When the merger announcement came from Nehru, it was unexpected and was made in Nizamabad in a public meeting held on March 5, 1956. He also said that there would be two Regional Councils to take care that there was no discrimination. He indicated that the decision had been arrived at with consent of all parties concerned.²⁰

The Congress High Command had agreed to bilingual states in Bombay and Punjab. It had not touched United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh) and Bihar – though Madhya Bharat was merged with Central Provinces and Berar to make Madhya Pradesh. In Bengal, it refused the Gorkhas a separate state.

How did the merger take place – with no sentiment, no logical reason, no recommendation by SRC, and with no apparent interest shown by Nehru? It seems fairly obvious from the historical and political context of Andhra State and Telangana region that several issues played a role in the merger decision:

1. Andhra State was virtually bankrupt as predicted²¹ before its formation and needed resources to carry on government and take up public investment²².
2. The Telangana region had annual surpluses in government revenue despite being a poorer area and had substantial negotiable investments accumulated and inherited from the Nizam's Government. Its industrialisation was more advanced than that in Andhra, with nearly 26 major industrial undertakings – many of them state owned or controlled²³. However, agriculture was backward partly due to

tenurial conditions (now corrected by the dissolution of the feudal order and the tenancy reform but needing more time and recourse to develop).

3. While the agriculture of the Delta districts was advanced (based on the British built *annicuts* across the Godavari and Krishna rivers), industrialisation was poor with only a few industrial units – AP Paper, Andhra Sugars and two or three jute mills. This was in the Coastal area – Rayalaseema had much less of an economic base and all its districts had annual revenue deficits which needed the help of the surplus generated in the Coastal districts.
4. Selecting an already built-up major city of Hyderabad as a third neutral choice could eliminate the rivalry between Kurnool and Guntur/Vijayawada and give an easy access to the capital for both Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra if merger came about.

The merger of the regions would also merge their two Congress Parties and present an effective defence against the CPI (which also would have one unit)²⁴. Moreover, the Congress felt that after the 1955 success in Andhra, it could repeat the same in Telangana in the 1957 General Election. The Communist Party of India (CPI) with a sizable share of the vote in both Andhra and in Telangana was equally confident²⁵. While the most of the Congress Party and as also the CPI were in favour of Vishalandhra, N.G. Ranga and his group were in doubt:

“It is indeed a matter of serious thought whether acquisition (*sic*) of Telangana would be a source of strength or embarrassment, whether it would pave the way more easily for the emergence of a Communist State in India”.²⁶

After the merger, the Congress Party was enormously strengthened. By making a strategic decision not to hold the Assembly election in the Andhra region in the 1957 General Election (because they had held a mid-term election in 1955), it allowed the Party machine to concentrate on the Telangana region. With the revived Party, alliance building with the other minor parties and caste groups, the Congress romped home with 68 of the 107 seats contested by polling 47% of the popular vote. The CPI was reduced to 23 seats with 26% of the popular vote.

With the consolidation of the two Congress Parties and the infusion of revenues and industrial resources from the Telangana, the ready-made capital and the prestige of Hyderabad city, the surplus food of the Coastal region - the new state of Andhra Pradesh was ready to move forward.

Party and Caste Effects in Andhra Pradesh (AP)

The Congress became a Reddy-dominated party -with the Reddy community holding 25% of the Legislature seats on average over the period 1957 to 1985²⁷ - with its bases largely in Rayalaseema and Telangana and maintaining its power by forming alliance

with the other dominant castes in their strongholds and trying to cater to the interest of the scheduled castes.

However, in 1968, the Telangana youth rose in protest at the lack of opportunities, the unfair treatment to their region and the whole series of broken promises and guarantees. The blame is equally distributed between the Andhra Congress leadership and also its Telangana politicians. There was an extreme need to harmonise the interests of the Andhra and Telangana regions, which were dissimilar in almost every aspect except language (and even that too with significant differences in spoken Telugu). Moreover, there were significant differences between Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions, which needed to be managed. In this task, it seems obvious that successive governments failed despite the shock of the 1968-72 agitations for restoration of the status quo ante of 1956²⁸.

Yet, despite its successes at diffusing the crisis of 1968-72, the Congress Party was perceived to have ignored important interests with a regional base – of the powerful and rich Kamma community in the Coastal districts and the development needs (especially irrigation) in Telangana. It paid the price for the former when the Kamma-dominated Telugu Desam Party (TDP) challenged its power in 1983 on a slogan of appeal to Telugu self-respect.

The TDP launched by N.T. Rama Rao swept into power in 1983 with a strong showing even in Telangana²⁹ when the Congress won only 60 of the 294 seats in the Assembly. The TDP did surprisingly well in Telangana where there was hardly any Kamma caste dominance³⁰. It seemed that the Telangana people hoped for a fairer treatment from the TDP. Again they were to be disappointed.

The TDP was ejected from power by its breakaway faction encouraged by the Congress Party³¹ but returned in 1985 with thumping majority of 202 seats out of 294 (winning 46% of the vote) with the Congress getting only 50 seats (with 37% of the vote). In Telangana, the Congress won only 13 of the 106 seats³².

In the Legislative Assemblies and Cabinets - which were crucial to both the Reddy-dominated leadership of the Congress and the Kamma-dominated leadership of the TDP - the party leaders had managed to handle the caste equations well. In terms of representation of castes, the Assemblies from 1982 to 1985 did not show any change in the numbers of Assembly members elected from each dominant caste except a drop of 9 seats for Reddys. In the four cabinets between 1982 and 1985, the representation of Brahmins fell by 2%, of Reddys by 6% but that of the Backward Caste-Kapus fell from 58 % to 30%. The Kamma representation in the Cabinet doubled to 6% in 1983 but fell back to 4% in 1985.³³


However, by 1999, caste-based voting had become the fact of AP politics: survey data showed that 87% of Kammas and 62% of the “Peasant Other Backward Castes” in AP voted for the TDP while 77% of the Reddys, 64% of the Scheduled Castes and 60% of Muslims for the Congress.³⁴ This meant that the overall election result rested with the


other communities such as Kapus, “Service OBC’s” and Scheduled Tribes who voted almost equally for the two major parties³⁵ and could swing the very fine division of the floating vote (10%) which decided which party will get the majority of seats in the Assembly.

Emergence of other caste groups such as the Kapu-dominated Praja Rajyaam Party (PRP) or issues such as separate Telangana has upset the caste balance which first came into being in 1956 and the new balance re-established in 1983.³⁶ It is not clear what this 2009 balance represents, as it was overtaken by events. These events are still to crystallise but one thing is sure, separation of Telangana will change everything including the caste equations within all three regions – Coastal Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana.

Telangana Resurgence: A Summary Analysis

In 1956, when the merger was forced on the Telangana, its people were just coming out of feudal dependency and the traumatic invasion/liberation by the Indian Army. Soon after, they faced the most serious Communist revolution in the history of the country, which was crushed by the Army³⁷.

 people had trusted their sovereign, the Nizam, and he failed them. They went along with their natural leaders - their feudal aristocracy and the urban intelligentsia who had been frightened by the sudden transition and the Communist threat. Even after Nehru reversed his position for retention of a united Hyderabad state, then again on an independent Telangana, the merger with Andhra was accepted with some reluctance as is illustrated by the Gentleman’s Agreement³⁸. Nehru assured them on 5th March 1956, at Nizamabad: “*We are marrying off an innocent girl to a naughty boy – they may get on; if they do not, they can divorce*”³⁹. Nehru envisaged problems for the very start but consoled himself (and Telangana) that separation was possible if the merger did not result in a fair outcome.

The Gentleman’s Agreement.⁴⁰  lved all the possible guarantees and assurances⁴¹ and political formations⁴² that were possible within the Constitutional framework. For those that were not, the Constitution was amended giving the President of India powers to issue orders to ensure equity and fairness. The details were extensively reported on and accepted by successive state governments but nonetheless led to unrest in Telangana in the 1968-69 largely to the perception that the guarantees had become ineffective over time.

With the steady decline of the Communist Party of India (CPI) – accelerated by a split in 1962 and formation of the Communist Party of India -Marxist (CPM) - the ruling Congress Party was now predominant. This dominance of the Congress Party seemingly ensured that its Telangana section offered no political counter pressure⁴³.

The penny dropped late in 1968. By this time – 12 years after merger- the middle classes in Telangana had grown in number and confidence, they had got themselves educated and demanded their fair share of government jobs. Their revolt was combined with the

agitation of Telangana irrigation engineers who exposed the scandals of Telangana's Nagarjuna Left Bank canal being deprived of water, the delay in taking up Pochampad project and the diversion of Telangana "surpluses" to Andhra.

All this drove the movement for separation forward. Politicians jumped on the band wagon but despite their electoral success in 1971, when the Congress High Command issued a *dictat* they meekly folded and accepted the idea that a Telangana man (P. V. Narasimha Rao) as Chief Minister (CM) would make the difference.

Now it was the turn of "Jai Andhra" movement of 1972 - ostensibly over the re-introduction of Mulki Rules for protection of employment in the Telangana region for its residents⁴⁴. The reluctance to allow reservation of Telangana jobs for Telangana residents, the refusal to accept a Telangana CM, the drastic land ceiling laws that threatened to dispossess the kulaks and big farmers of Andhra, all this combined to fuel the Andhra separatist movement⁴⁵.

At that point, bifurcation would have met with the greatest approval in both regions. However, Mrs. Indira Gandhi decided against it. Why, no one knows! So, once again a Nehru gave assurances⁴⁶ to keep the State and the state Congress Party united.

A Constitutional Amendment⁴⁷ and a Presidential Order on Public Services, 1975,⁴⁸ were issued to protect Telangana's legitimate employment opportunities. Employment guarantees renewed in 1969-75 again proved as useless as the earlier ones and successive government committees revealed this.⁴⁹ A detailed report was issued by the State Government on the implementation of the Presidential Order and the consequent G.O.Ms. 610⁵⁰. The successive TDP and Congress Governments accepted the recommendations of this Report and a Legislature Committee was set up to monitor and ensure their effective implementation. A study of these reports indicates that the will to be fair was simply not there which was acknowledged by the Legislature in its attempt to correct the distortions of the past and ensure justice.

The estimated number of students killed in police firing in 1968-71 varies between 30-40 (official estimates) and 200-300 (unofficial estimates)⁵². Many thousands are reported to have defected to Naxalism and tens of thousands went to America – a land that gave them a brighter future than their own.

After thirty years, the current movement began. The massive expansion of Hyderabad city itself revealed the enormous wealth acquisition by the non-Telangana people with political connections. The growth of tertiary education increased the demand for white-collar jobs. With sluggish growth in general employment, the attention turned to the government jobs that had been assured for Telangana since 1956, lost in 1971 with the abolishment of Mulki Rules and renewed in 1975 by the Presidential Order but not implemented.

Current Movement and Promises Made

This time the movement was driven by a revolt of the children of working class and peasant families - families that had invested their money and their future in the education of the children in the hope of employment. But liberalisation also led to a dearth of government jobs. It now meant that every village in Telangana was now on the warpath - quietly, firmly and steadfastly - for a separate Telangana. They hoped that when it came, their children's future would be better⁵³.

The rapid growth of the post liberalisation business, the rise in land prices, the scams in allocation of land in and around Hyderabad, the influx of settlers from Andhra all made a potent brew. It had to explode and it did - in the Telangana fashion - quietly and mostly at their own cost – 600 students have committed suicide in protest till date⁵⁴. (The Sri Krishna Committee (SKC) Report refers to 313 suicides by students over a three-month period⁵⁵).

In 1999 General Election, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), with the TDP as one of its members, gained victory. One of its electoral promises was the creation of four new states including Telangana. But when in power, the NDA created only three new States and left Telangana out. Why? L. K. Advani writes:

“A peculiar situation has arisen in the case of the demand for a separate Telangana, a demand which is as old as the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956. The BJP has backed this demand. However, we could not do anything in this regard since Telugu Desam, which supported the Vajpayee government between 1998 and 2004, was opposed to it”.⁵⁶

By 2004, the Congress, in alliance in AP with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) which was established for achievement of a Telangana state, and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) capitalised on the Telangana sentiment to drive the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and its ally the BJP out of power in the State and the Centre respectively. It promised that: “The U.P.A. Government will consider the demand for formation of Telangana State at an appropriate time after due consultations and consensus.”⁵⁷

After the election, both State and Central Governments were now committed to Telangana statehood. The TDP, which opposed separate Telangana, was thrown out of power in Andhra Pradesh – so it must be assumed that the AP electorate voted for bifurcation in 2004. The parties that promised a separate Telangana state – Congress, TRS, BJP and Communist Party of India (CPI) won 51% of the votes cast all over the state while the TDP and CPM, which opposed the break up, got 39% of the votes⁵⁸. (By 2009, however, all political parties except CPM and All-India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), which promised statehood for Telangana polled altogether 89% of the votes cast⁵⁹).

The President in his Address to the Joint Session of Parliament in 2004 stated “The UPA Government will consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state at an appropriate time after due consultations.”⁶⁰ The UPA set up the Pranab Mukherjee

Committee to establish national consensus and come to a decision. Most national parties stated their views in writing to this Committee in 2005.

Chandrasekhar, the former Prime Minister (PM) said “The demand for Telangana state is a genuine demand emanating from the aspirations of the people.. Telangana has all the qualities that a self-sustaining state needs: economic viability, public support, unique cultural traditions, optimum geographical size and relevant historical context”.⁶¹

Another former PM, V. P. Singh stated: “Any delay in clinching the issue will not only cause erosion of credibility of the present Government but will also force the people of Telangana to go back to the agitation mode”.⁶²

A third former PM, Inder Gujral recalled history: “Over the years – ever since the Indira Gandhi era – I have felt that formation of this state would go a long way to end many agonies and sufferances of the people in this region and provide opportunities for their socio-economic development”.⁶³

Sharad Pawar, Leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, added: “The demand of the people of Telangana for a separate state is not a new or sudden development. It has been there for more than five decades. The grievances of the people of the region are real and their demand for a Telangana State is genuine.”⁶⁴

Lalu Yadav of the Rastriya Janata Dal understood what was driving the movement - “The people of the region have been fighting for it for more than a half-a-century. It is a people’s movement in real sense. This movement has always been solidly backed by every section of the people of the region. Intellectuals, government employees, students remained all through, as the backbone of the movement. And now, it has percolated down to the agrarian sector and the working classes.... The people of this region strongly feel and they have every reason to feel so - that they can no longer live in the integrated state of Andhra Pradesh with self-respect and dignity”.⁶⁵

Bahujan Samaj Party’s Mayawati played it even more boldly. She said, “The demand of the people of Telangana for a separate state is not a new or sudden development. It has been there for the last five to six decades.... Any further delay in forming the State of Telangana will send wrong signals to the people.”⁶⁶ To add, as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, she wanted her own state divided into four separate ones to help development and to devolve power to closer to the people.

Since, by 2005, the national political parties were for a separate Telangana, why did it not happen? While earlier, the BJP could do nothing due to the opposition of TDP, now the Congress High Command could do nothing due to the opposition of Y S Rajasehkar Reddy, the AP Chief Minister who became a major power in the Congress Party. The Congress dodged the issue throughout 2004-09; it repeated its promise for separate Telangana in the General Election of 2009; won the election again even though TDP now chastened, supported a separate Telangana in its manifesto and allied itself with the TRS!

But once again the Congress was busy dodging the issue when suddenly the leadership in AP changed when the CM died in a helicopter crash.

The whole situation became fluid and, after further agitations, the AP political parties agreed for Telangana statehood and the Congress Legislature Party passed the decision to their Party President, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi. She decided in favour, the Union Cabinet resolved to do the same and the historic announcement of Mr. P. Chidambaram, Home Minister, on December 9, 2009 followed: “The process of forming the state of Telangana will be initiated. An appropriate resolution will be moved in the State Assembly”.⁶⁷ On the next day, he announced this to the Lok Sabha⁶⁸ and the Rajya Sabha⁶⁹. He made a full statement to the Press.⁷⁰

Some Andhra political leaders and vested interests holding land in and around Hyderabad then sparked off an agitation and this time it was not “Jai Andhra” as in 1971 but it was fuelled by real estate developers who feared a loss in values if the State is bifurcated with Hyderabad as its capital⁷¹. The leading advocates of unified state or at least Hyderabad as a Union Territory⁷² had major investments in land in and around Hyderabad.⁷³

Government of India Backtracks: Committee Appointed

However, the agitation by the Andhra region began; it resulted in a stay of execution; and status quo was ordered; and the Sri Krishna Committee (SKC) (formally the “Committee for Consultations On the Situation in Andhra Pradesh”) was then set up. This distracted the Telangana movement for 11 months while the SKC carried on its work, field visits and public consultations⁷⁴. The SKC did engage all the concerned interests, and was provided with an enormous volume of data and tens of thousands of submissions.⁷⁵

Its Report of 505 pages of the main Volume with another 183 pages of Appendix Volume was submitted and made public. A thorough analysis and critique of it is given below.⁷⁶

Status Quo Opposed- Telangana Deprived

The SKC came out with incontrovertible points, which had fuelled the separatist movement for so long: These were:

1. “Overall, in spite of 50 plus years of policy protected planning and execution, one finds regional variations in the economic development of AP.”⁷⁷
2. The SKC noted that the Planning Commission notified as backward nine of the ten Telangana districts – with the exception of Hyderabad and resources have been allocated under its Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF). These districts contain, as the SKC says, 87% of the population of Telangana.⁷⁸
3. Considering the allegation that: “Telangana has low per capita income, lower access to employment, lower business opportunities and low access to education and so on”,

SKC said, “At the outset, some or all such allegations appear true when absolute amounts, numbers and percentages are reviewed.”⁷⁹

4. In Telangana, the “net irrigation by canals has increased only slightly from about 1 lakh hectare to around 2.5 lakh hectares. Tank irrigation has reduced from 4 lakh hectares in 1955-56 to around 2 lakh hectares at present.”⁸⁰
5. “The implementation of G.O. 610 during 1985 to 2005 was, at best, tardy, which remains a grievance of Telangana employees. This issue continues to be highly contentious even today.”⁸¹
6. “However, the data received from the State Government shows (Appendix 3.16) that the combined amount released to government and aided colleges together is Rs. 93 crores in Telangana while it is Rs. 224 crores in coastal Andhra (with college-going population similar to that in Telangana) and Rs. 91 crores in Rayalaseema (with population share being less than half that in Telangana).”⁸²
7. “The real income of the agricultural wage labourers has declined considerably in Telangana whereas it has increased considerably in coastal Andhra region. Similarly, the SCs, STs and minorities in Telangana region have suffered a decline in income during the past about decade or more, whereas these communities have gained substantially in Coastal Andhra.”⁸³

The Movement

8. “The present agitation, however, shows that the demand only lay dormant and could get re-ignited under specific circumstances. While the issue of rightful shares in public employment remains the key point of discord even in the current agitation, a new turn has been given to the demand by Telangana region asserting that it has a separate cultural identity which is distinct from that of Andhra and Rayalaseema regions.”⁸⁴
9. “The movement has also successfully performed the function of educating the people about Telangana’s grievances to the extent that even school children have now been made conversant with issues around the demand for a separate state. Equally helpful to this cause have been NRI Telanganites (NRIs from the opposite side have participated by opposing formation of Telangana) who are known to be supporting the movement in several ways and who have also represented to the Committee. The present movement is considered to be much more extensive than the one in 1969 (which was mostly confined to urban locations), a process in which modern technologies of communication and modern ways of conducting politics have surely helped.”⁸⁵
10. “While the JACs⁸⁶ have sprung up in all the three regions, the most vibrant and numerous are in Telangana region with their reach going down to mandal and even

village level. The JACs have successfully mobilized the common people who have articulated their particular interests through the movement.”⁸⁷

Power Groups

11. “The dominant upper castes, the Reddys, Kammas, Velamas and Kapus, continue to hold the reins of power in the state. The Brahmins are much less influential politically due to smaller numbers; however, Coastal Andhra Brahmins played a historic role in forging a Telugu identity through their writings, eventually leading to the birth of Andhra state. They were equally important in intellectual articulation of the cause of economically oppressed social groups and contributed to the extreme left movement to which major support was provided by coastal Kammas.”⁸⁸
12. “The upper castes in Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra are vehemently against the idea of dividing the state; their greatest fear being the loss of Hyderabad. The accommodation between these two regions has been in terms of political domination by Rayalaseema and economic domination by Coastal Andhra. Together the two regions have ruled the state through Congress and TDP political formations. Telangana feels dominated by the upper castes of these regions and its struggle is primarily to shake off their yoke.”⁸⁹
13. “Large scale involvement of students including those from Dalits and Backward Castes in the current movement for Telangana seems to testify to this. A large proportion of student leaders of the movement located in Osmania and Kakatiya Universities is known to be from Dalit/BC background. According to many sources, purported student suicides during the course of the agitation are also largely by Dalit and Backward Caste students.”⁹⁰
14. “The Madiga caste, which is predominant in Telangana and more numerous on the whole, has had less access to reservation benefits than the Malas who predominate in Coastal Andhra. The former would certainly benefit from a separate Telangana but then their brethren in the coastal state would lose out without sub-categorisation. The economic disaffection of SCs in Telangana versus their rapid strides in education form a potent mixture for agitation politics as is seen from the extensive participation of Dalit youth in the student movement. This is the very same constituency which may feel attracted towards and become co-opted by extreme left ideologies.”⁹¹
15. “The Muslims in Telangana, contrary to common belief, are doing well on consumption (improvement by 76%) and poverty reduction levels (33 points).”⁹²
16. “In 2007, literacy rates for the youth population aged 8-24 for SCs and Muslims in Telangana are ahead of or at par with those in the other two regions.”⁹³
17. “For example, it is possible that the ST community and the Muslims in AP may get a relatively better say in governance on separation in the state of Telangana.”⁹⁴

Logic of the Movement

18. “Although as a sub-regional movement, the Telangana movement does not pose a threat to national unity.”⁹⁵
19. “The Telangana movement can be interpreted as a desire for greater democracy and empowerment within a political unit. As stated earlier, sub-regionalism is a movement, which is not necessarily primordial but is essentially modern – in the direction of a balanced and equitable modernization. Our analysis shows that cutting across caste, religion, gender and other divisions, the Telangana movement brings a focus on the development of the region as a whole, a focus on rights and access to regional resources and further, it pitches for a rights-based development perspective whereby groups and communities put forth their agendas within a larger vision of equitable development.”⁹⁶
20. “However, given the long-standing history of the demand for a separate state, the deep penetration of the sense of grievance and the widespread emotion around the issue, unless genuine steps are taken to address both real and perceived disparities, the demand is unlikely to go away permanently even if it is subdued temporarily.”⁹⁷
21. “Thus, from the point of view of sheer size of economy, Telangana as a new state can sustain itself both with and without Hyderabad. The other combination of regions – Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema together can also sustain themselves as a state; in fact they can also sustain themselves separately.”^{98 99}

SKC Summing Up

22. “In view of the complex background of the situation and the rather serious and sensitive emotional aspects involved, the Committee is of the unanimous view that it would not be practical to simply maintain the status quo in respect of the situation.”¹⁰⁰
23. “Given the above first hand observations of the Committee during its tours of the regions, the Committee feels that the issue of sentiment has to be considered only as one among several factors to be evaluated. While not discounting people’s wishes or sentiments, the overall implications of bifurcation (or trifurcation as the case may be) have to be carefully delineated to arrive at a responsible recommendation.”¹⁰¹
24. “The Committee is of the view that given the long history of the demand for a separate Telangana, the highly charged emotions at present and the likelihood of the agitation continuing in case the demand is not met (unless handled deftly, tactfully and firmly as discussed under Option Six), consideration has to be given to this option. The grievances of the people of Telangana, such as non-implementation of some of the key decisions included in the Gentleman’s Agreement (1956), certain amount of neglect in implementation of water and irrigation schemes, inadequate provision for education infrastructure (excluding Hyderabad), and the undue delay in

the implementation of the Presidential Order on Public Employment etc., have contributed to the felt psyche of discrimination and domination, with the issue attaining an emotional pitch. The continuing demand, therefore, for a separate Telangana, the Committee felt, has some merit and is not entirely unjustified.”¹⁰²

25. “Therefore, after taking into account all the pros and cons, the Committee did not think it to be the most preferred, but the second best option. Separation is recommended only in case it is unavoidable and if this decision can be reached amicably amongst all the three regions.”¹⁰³

SKC tried to do a difficult enough job but failed to defuse the Telangana movement.

It admitted that the united state would not work as usual (Option 1). It toyed with Options 2 to 4 and rejected them itself¹⁰⁴. It preferred Option 6 – a united state with a Telangana Regional Committee (TRC), a River Water Development Board and Constitutional Amendment. This history of trying to deal with Telangana rights was seemingly to be repeated without much change. Trying to repeat history could hardly find support from those who feel ill served by it in the past. The TRC had been set up along with a similar one for Punjab by amending the Constitution. When the Punjab model did not work the state was divided. When the TRC was abolished the same lesson was not drawn as was for Punjab. What was good for Punjab was not to be applied to Telangana.

The SKC labelled Option 5 - what had been accepted by all parties in December 2009 – separate state for Telangana – as a “second best” one. It only felt that the Telangana state should be conceded only if it was ‘unavoidable’. This was the whole point of the agitation and decision of 9th December 2009!

The SKC Report’s semi-secret Chapter 8 –“Law and Order and Internal Security Implications” (in the published Report containing only 152 words) was challenged in the High Court. The last 52 words of Chapter 8 said: “A note on the above covering all aspects has been prepared and is being submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs in a separate cover along with this Report. The Committee has kept these dimensions in view while discussing various options included in Chapter 9 of the Report, i.e., “The Way Forward”.” (Emphasis added)¹⁰⁵. The Court felt that these critical 52 words damned the Report’s painstakingly constructed edifice of a 1,46,071-word text¹⁰⁶.

The judgment of the High Court stated that:

“The manoeuvre suggested by the Committee in its secret supplementary note poses an open challenge, if not threat, to the very system of democracy. If the source of inputs that gave rise to this is the Government, it (the Government) owes an explanation to the citizens. If, on the other hand, the origin of inputs is elsewhere, the Government must move in the right earnest to pluck and eradicate such foul source and thereby prove its respect for, and confidence in, the democracy.”¹⁰⁷.

Thus the Court revealed what amounts to a conspiracy involving many personalities, in an attempt to fool 40 million people of Telangana ¹⁰⁸. It did not take much – only a fair and independent judiciary - to cast light on the dark places that the Sri Krishna Committee has hidden its secret “notes”¹⁰⁹. The Court revealed that the whole chapter/note outlined the steps to be taken to defeat the Telangana separatist movement. It led the High Court to state: “If one has any doubt about the hidden opposition of the Committee for formation of Telangana, that stands removed with this note”¹¹⁰. This rang the death knell to the Report and cast doubt over the reputations of its five members¹¹¹.

Even before the judgement by the AP High Court, some distinguished Andhra intellectuals issued an open letter pleading for bifurcation. It is written with great balance and grace and wisdom and it is worth quoting extensively. They said that the inclusion of Telangana to create Andhra Pradesh in 1956 had been against the wishes of the majority of leaders from the region.

The separation between the Telangana and the Seemandhra areas since 1800 CE had created unbridgeable gulf between social, educational, economic milieu and political and cultural consciousness of the two regions. The last five-and-a-half decades of togetherness had failed to bring about equitable development in different regions and harmonize the relations between the peoples.¹¹²

They also said:

The presence of about 30 lakh people from Coastal and Rayalaseema in Hyderabad for the last 56 years should not be a factor in deciding the future of the state. They will continue to remain an integral part of the Hyderabad the same way as the Maratha, Kannadiga, Gujarati and Punjabi people. Claiming special rights by these or any other group is irrational and unjustified.¹¹³

They added:

The apprehensions of these people have to be removed by discussions with the leaders of Telangana and Central government. The need of the hour is the emotional oneness, which is severely lacking, rather than an enforced administrative and political togetherness of the regions as a single integrated state.¹¹⁴

Even as far ago as 2003, the present Home Minister Chidambaram stated: “Someone — or something has to break this logjam”. He went on, “the answer does not lie in police action. Perhaps there may be an answer if the people of the region are empowered in a different way, and new opportunities are created for the disaffected sections to gain political power and a say in the governance of the region.” Chidambaram concluded: “Strange as it seems, the option of a new state of Telangana may turn out to be the answer to deal with the menace of Naxalite terrorism.”¹¹⁵

Conclusion

The election of 2009 was decisive for Andhra Pradesh. This time all major political parties – the Congress, TDP, PRP, CPI, TRS and BJP - supported and promised bifurcation of the state and the creation of Telangana. Opposed to this were the All- AIMIM and the CPM though these two parties were formally allied to Congress and TDP respectively - making strange bedfellows. As indicated earlier, the share of the vote for the parties promising a Telangana state in 2009 was nearly 90%¹¹⁶.

However, much of the usual delay and obfuscation resulted from the inaction of the ruling Congress Party in the State in implementation of this electoral promise (as they had in 2004) provoked the agitation with students among whom many committed ritual suicide for the Telangana cause. With the death of Y.S.Rajasekhara Reddy in September, the agitation accelerated and culminated on 9th December 2009 when the Centre accepted the recommendations of the AP All-Party Meeting and the Congress High Command, that of the AP Congress Legislative Party.

However, with the stay of this decision and the constitution of the SKC, the movement shifted from agitation and electoral politics to an argumentative and propagandist phase. While the JAC refused to engage with the SKC dialogue process, all groups in Andhra Pradesh – both for Telangana, Coastal Andhra, and Rayalaseema - as well as caste groups, NRI's and civil society groups vied at making submissions to SKC. The SKC field visits took the issue to almost every district of Telangana as also many in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. This also had the effect of convincing elements in Coastal Andhra that bifurcation would be the best solution¹¹⁷. By now the Kamma dominant caste in the Coastal Andhra had begun to feel that they were getting a raw deal under the Reddy-dominated Congress government¹¹⁸.

The year 2010 saw a virtual split in the main parties – Congress, TDP and PRP – neither of which were in apposition to make a single submission and, therefore, allowed each regional grouping within their party, take its own stand. As a result, this hardened into a real division within these parties with PRP even quietly abandoning its position as its Telangana elements defected to other parties (the PRP was anyway to merge with the Congress in 2011). The division on regional basis affected not just the political parties but also the legal profession, Non-Gazetted Government officers, irrigation and power employees, students, academics, journalists, and finally the police¹¹⁹. Even the State Cabinet was divided with 16 ministers from the Andhra region stating in a written submission to the SKC that the whole Telangana movement was “seditious” and anti-national.¹²⁰

The polity is currently is fractured and divided *de facto* and the consequences were clear especially in view of the challenge to the national leadership by Y. S. Rajashekar Reddy's son Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy. He led his father's faction into opposition when the Congress High Command would not agree to his succeeding his father as Chief Minister – something which 122 Congress legislators are reputed to have signed up for.

The caste alignment brought the division between Malas (dominant in Andhra) and Madigas (dominant in Telangana) into the regional issue - each supporting their regional base and preferring bifurcation as a way of avoiding intra- Scheduled Caste conflict that had been brewing for a decade¹²¹. The Kammas and Kapus (dominant in Coastal Andhra) seemed to back bifurcation and even trifurcation with a separate Coastal Andhra just as the Reddys were demanding a Rayalaseema State.

The Rayalaseema Reddys preferred a Rayala-Telangana option preferring to deal with Telengana Reddys rather than Coastal Andhras if the state was to be divided. When this option was seen unacceptable to Telangana¹²², the Greater Rayalaseema option was touted with the coastal districts of Nellore and Ongole (with Reddy dominance) proposed to be added to the four Rayalaseema districts¹²³ as a last resort.

As for the Muslims¹²⁴, the AIMIM preferences were first, for a united State; then, for a Rayala-Telangana and, finally, for a separate Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital. This revealed a remarkably negotiating position, which showed how open it had kept its final option¹²⁵. The only option it opposed was that of Hyderabad as a Union Territory¹²⁶.

All in all, apart from the real estate vested interests and to some degree the fear of Andhras' settled in Hyderabad, the SKC's exercise seemed to have consolidated public opinion in favour of division of the State despite its ambiguous Report.

The Telangana Tragedy seems to be coming to a close and the long sought for political self-assertion of the region seems imminent. The SKC has rejected the continuation of the status quo (Option 1) and it has dismissed Options 2, 3 and 4 as unworkable. Its choice was for a united state with constitutional guarantees and regional councils – that had been either neglected (constitutional guarantees) or abandoned (regional councils). By having confessed that the status quo was not maintainable this particular logic of the SKC seemed somewhat obscure. Finally, all other logical reasoning leads towards the division of the State and the state polity is again coming around to accepting the inevitable as it did in December 9, 2009, as illustrated by the public statement by Andhra intellectuals cited above.

For this eventuality, the only other political issue is that of bifurcation or trifurcation of the State. In any event, all units will do well with some stability and hard work and with less attention to party and caste politics with which the AP political elite has been engaged for the last 55 years.

¹ For a definitive work on the subject see Rao, 1973.

² As early as 16 December 1952, three days before he announced the Andhra formation, Nehru wrote to Rajagopalachari, Chief Minister of Madras State saying of the people of Andhra: "Their state will be a backward one in many ways and financially hard up. They cannot expect much help from the centre. However, that is their look out. If they want the state, they can have it on conditions that we have stated ." (i e, without Madras city) (Gopal, 1979, p 258).

³ See, Sherman, 2007 and Pingle, 2010).

⁴ Nehru, 1987, p. 320- 321 (Emphasis added)

⁵ Nehru, 1954, p.60

⁶ Nehru, 1987, p.58, fn

⁷ Ibid., p. 114

⁸ Ambedkar, 1955, Chapter III

⁹ Ambedkar, 1955, Chapter II

¹⁰ Nehru, 1954, p.179 (Emphasis added)

¹¹ Nehru, 1987, p.334

¹² Ibid., para 382 (Emphasis added)

¹³ Ibid., para 386 (Emphasis added)

¹⁴ Even Gray (1971, pp.464: 466) noted the social tensions between the two Telugu populations.

¹⁵ See Noorani for a succinct summary of the documentation. Also Sundarayya, 1972, pp.88-89

¹⁶ Reddy, 1989, p.293

¹⁷ Even the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist)) acknowledged: "Telangana movement is the precursor to land reforms initiative in Andhra Pradesh. The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act enacted in 1950 with its subsequent amendments resulted in the Conferment of Protection to nearly 6 lakh tenants with over 75 lakh acres in their possession. This constituted 33 percent of the total cultivated area." http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2005/september/report5.htm (Accessed on 6th May 2011). The success was ensured by " the best-framed and most comprehensive census in the country conducted in 1949 (Thorner and Thorner , 1962, pp.170-171).

¹⁸ See Windermiller, 1955 and Selig Harrison, 1956.

¹⁹ See Ram, 1973

²⁰ The Hindu, March 7, 1956

²¹ As early as 16 December 1952, three days before he announced the Andhra formation, Nehru wrote to Rajagopalachari, Chief Minister of Madras State saying of the people of Andhra: "Their state will be a backward one in many ways and financially hard up. They cannot expect much help from the centre." (Gopal, 1979, p 258).

²² The SRC stated "The existing Andhra state has faced a financial problem of some magnitude ever since it was created and in comparison with Telangana the existing Andhra state has a low per capita revenue. Telangana, on the other hand, is much less likely to be faced with financial embarrassment. The much higher incidence of land revenue in Telangana and excise revenue of the order of Rs 5 crore per annum principally explain this difference. Whatever the explanation may be, some Telangana leaders seem to fear that the result of unification will be to exchange some settled sources of revenue, out of which development schemes may be financed, for financial uncertainty similar to that which Andhra is now faced. Telangana claims to be progressive and from an administrative point of view, unification, it is contended, is not likely to confer any benefits on this area"(SRC, 1955, para 376).

²³ Pavier, 1981, p.52-58

²⁴ The then Hyderabad Chief Minister, B Ramakrishna Rao, from his sickbed issued an appeal to the Andhras to vote Congress otherwise: "...the people of Telangana, who have had bitter experience of the Communist atrocities, would be loath to accept a Vishalandhra in case a non-Congress government is formed in Andhra. If there is a Government favourable to the Congress ideas in Andhra, the way for the formation of Vishalandhra will be clear.A non-Congress Government in Andhra would be against the early execution of the Nandikonda (Nagarjunasagar) project, which would do good to people in Hyderabad and Andhra States. (Quoted in *The Hindu*, 10 February 1950.).

²⁵ Ram, 1973, p.303 and.308

²⁶ Quoted in Indian Express, 7th July 1953.

²⁷ Reddy, 1989, Table 13, p.305

²⁸ Gray, 1970, 1971, 1974 and Bernstroff, 1973

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- ²⁹ http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/statisticalreports/SE_1983/Statistical%20Report%20Andhra%20Pradesh%201983.pdf) (Accessed on 5th May 2011)
- ³⁰ Reddy, 1989,p.291
- ³¹ See Reddy, 1989,pp.287-289
- ³² (http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/statisticalreports/SE_1985/StatisticalReport%201985%20andhra%20pradesh.pdf) (Accessed on 5th May 2011)
- ³³ Reddy, 1989, Tables 12 and 13, pp.305-306
- ³⁴ Suri, 2002, Table 6.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ See Srinivasulu, 2002
- ³⁷ See Sundarayya , 1972; Sherman ,2007; Ram, 1973; Pavier, 1981
- ³⁸ For the text see Rao, 1973, p.301-303
- ³⁹ “*Ek masoom bholi bhali ladki ko ek natkat ladke ke saath shaadi kiya jaa raha hai, chahe toh woh milke reh sakte hai ya bichad sakte hai*”. Nehru, 1956
- ⁴⁰ For the text see Rao, 1973, p.301-303
- ⁴¹ The Nizam’s Mulki Rules safeguarding jobs for Telangana residents was re-issued as a Government Order (G.O. Ms. GAD 813 dated 18.5.1957) with retrospective effect from 1.11.1956- date of merger. These Rules were repealed in 1959 with the Public Employment Act and Rules which came into force on 21.2.1959.
- ⁴² Such as a Regional Council for Telangana (see Rao, 1973, p 301-303 for details as in the Gentleman’s Agreement)
- ⁴³ The Gentleman’s Agreement accepted that the Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee would be kept separate from the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee. This would ensure that Congress candidates for elected office would be selected separately by each regional party. This arrangement was terminated in 1960 leaving little time for the Telangana party elite to find its feet.
- ⁴⁴ The Mulki Rules Bill in the Parliament was enacted in October 1972.
- ⁴⁵ See Gray, 1974.
- ⁴⁶ These were the Six Point Program of 1971 and the Five Point Formula of 1972 (Gray 1974, pp.338 and 341-342). All parties agreed another Six Point Formula in 1973, which formed the basis of the Presidential Order of 1975. The G.O.Ms. 610 to give effect to the Order was issued only in 1985!! It took ten years for the State Government to formally issue its orders to implement the Presidential Order and even that GO was ignored or violated (see Girglani, 2002).
- ⁴⁷ Constitution of India (Thirty -two Amendment) Act, 1973
- ⁴⁸ India, Government of, 1975
- ⁴⁹ See Girglani, 2002
- ⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ⁵² Bernstorff and Gray 1998, p.169
- ⁵³ See Kannabiran et al, 2010 for a vivid picture of the grass roots attitudes.
- ⁵⁴ (<http://www.gr8telangana.com/2011/03/students%E2%80%99solidarity-committee-march-to-parliament-for-separate-telangana/>) (Accessed on 5th May 2011)
- ⁵⁵ SKC (2010), p.387
- ⁵⁶ Advani, L.K, 2008, p.740 and 742
- ⁵⁷ U.P.A. Common Minimum Programme was adopted in 2004.
- ⁵⁸ http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/statisticalreports/SE_2004/StatisticalReports_AP_2004.pdf (Accessed on 4th May 2011)
- ⁵⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Andhra_Pradesh_state_assembly_elections_results_2009" (Accessed on 4th May 2011)
- ⁶⁰ President of India, “Address to the Joint Session of Parliament”, New Delhi, 7th June, 2004
- ⁶¹ Chandrasekhar, Ex PM , letter to Pranab Mukherjee 21st May 2005
- ⁶² V.P.Singh Ex PM, Letter to Sonia Gandhi, 25th May 2005
- ⁶³ I K Gujral ,Ex PM, Letter to Pranab Mukherjee , 24th May 2005
- ⁶⁴ Sharad Parwar, President, NCP , Letter to Pranab Mukherjee 2nd May 2005
- ⁶⁵ Lalu Prasad, President, Rastriya Janata Dal , Letter to Pranab Mukherjee , 20th May 2005

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- ⁶⁶ Km. Mayawati President, Bahujan Samaj Party, Letter to Pranab Mukherjee , 8th May 2005
- ⁶⁷ Press Statement, Home Ministry, 9th December 2009,
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/process-of-forming-telangana-state-to-be-initiated-chidambaram_100286938.html (Accessed on 5th May 2011)
- ⁶⁸ http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/waiting-for-information-on-new-state-from-andhra-pranab-lead_100287209.html (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
- ⁶⁹ http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/chidambaram-defends-telangana-announcement-second-lead_100287141.html (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
- ⁷⁰ http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/full_text_of_chidambarams_telangana_statement.php (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
- ⁷¹ Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar writes: “Vast amounts of land around Hyderabad have been grabbed in questionable ways. In a new Telengana, many existing landowners—including major industrialists—may lose enormous tracts of land worth thousands of crores. Illegal land grabbing has till now been very lucrative, but may become the kiss of death after Telengana’s creation.” (Emphasis added).
<http://swaminomics.org/?p=256> (Accessed 4th May 2011).
- ⁷² This idea of Hyderabad as a Union Territory is a hoary one, which repeats itself. Mrs. Indira Gandhi writing to Mr M. Naryana Reddy, MP said: “ I have heard of the suggestion to make the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad a Union Territory as a means to solve the present Andhra Pradesh crisis. It seems that its full implications have not been considered by those who have made this suggestion” (Letter dated February, 1973) .
- ⁷³ SKC, 2010, pp.316-319, 404 and 442
- ⁷⁴ The signal exception was the Joint Action Committee (JAC), which was responsible for leading the movement. It rejected the SKC, refused to appear before it, held that making submissions was a waste of time as a political decision had been taken and all that was required was to implement it. The SKC recognised the importance of the JAC thus: “During this period, numerous Joint Action Committees (JACs) have been formed, the most prominent among them being the one at Osmania University led by Prof. Kodandaram. Initially, all political parties were members of this JAC but subsequently most parties including the TRS left the fold. However, JACs have spread to the district, mandal and village level in Telangana resulting in a groundswell of demand for a separate state”. (SKC, 2010, p.349)
- ⁷⁵ http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/full_text_of_chidambarams_telangana_statement.php (Accessed on 5th May 2011)
- ⁷⁶ SKC, 2010
- ⁷⁷ SKC, 2010, p.118 (Emphasis added)
- ⁷⁸ Ibid, p.81 (Emphasis added)
- ⁷⁹ Ibid, p.117 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸⁰ Ibid, p.189 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸¹ Ibid, p.48 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸² Ibid, p.153 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸³ Ibid, p.119 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸⁴ Ibid, p.342 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸⁵ Ibid, p.352 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸⁶ Joint Action Committees, which have become the driving forces of the movement.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid , p.359 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸⁸ Ibid, p.380 (Emphasis added)
- ⁸⁹ Ibid, p.390 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹⁰ Ibid, p.163 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹¹ Ibid , p.415 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹² Ibid, p.363 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹³ Ibid p.131 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹⁴ Ibid, p.122 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹⁵ Ibid , p.344 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹⁶ Ibid, p.415 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹⁷ Ibid, p.417 (Emphasis added)
- ⁹⁸ Ibid, p.121 (Emphasis added)

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- ⁹⁹ See Pingle, 2010a
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.442 (Emphasis added)
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.352-353 (Emphasis added)
- ¹⁰² Ibid, p.453 (Emphasis added)
- ¹⁰³ Ibid, p.453 (Emphasis added)
- ¹⁰⁴ However, Chidambaram speaking to the press on the day of the release of the Report stated that the SKC had itself rejected the first three options. (<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/read-telangana-report-with-an-open-mind-pc/139630-37-64.html>) (Accessed 6th May 2011) A careful reading of Chapter 9 (pp. 440-458) would indicate that the SKC ruled out the first four options are impracticable. Besides its Terms of Reference confined it to only two options – united AP or bifurcation and creation of Telengana: “To examine the situation in the State of Andhra Pradesh with reference to the demand for a separate State of Telangana as well as the demand for maintaining the present status of a united Andhra Pradesh.” (SKC, 2010, p.v)
- ¹⁰⁵ SKC, 2010, p. 423 (Emphasis added)
- ¹⁰⁶ Reddy (2011), Para. 65-71
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid, Para 103
- ¹⁰⁸ Reddy, 2011, Para 103
- ¹⁰⁹ It turned out that there was not a secret chapter but two secret “notes”- one on the issue itself and the other on how to manage the politicians, press and electronic media, police etc. in order to ensure a atmosphere conducive for a united state. (Reddy, 2011)
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid, Para 81
- ¹¹¹ In early May 2011, the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court has directed police to book case against all five members of the Sri Krishna Committee under Indian Penal Code (IPC), sections 153A (Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc.), 418 (Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect), 504 (insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace) and 505 (publishing or circulating statements of rumours). (<http://www.siasat.com/english/news/fir-against-srikrishna-committee>) Accessed on 1st June 2011.
- ¹¹² http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-12/hyderabad/28683658_1_telangana-seemandhra-rayalaseema (Accessed 6th May 2011)
- ¹¹³ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ Chidambaram (2003)
- ¹¹⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Andhra_Pradesh_state_assembly_elections_results_2009 (Accessed on 4th May 2011)
- ¹¹⁷ <http://expressbuzz.com/states/andhra-pradesh/splittsville-the-only-option-says-ajac/176188.html>
- ¹¹⁸ <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Kammas-getting-raw-deal-in-Cong-Rayapati/articleshow/5908657.cms> (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
- ¹¹⁹ http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-19/hyderabad/29146024_1_separate-state-police-force-police-action (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
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- ¹²³ <http://www.hindu.com/2009/12/09/stories/2009120957630400.htm> (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
- ¹²⁴ Muslims were divided with the AIMIM taking a complex and flexible position. Other Muslim bodies favoured separation.http://www.twocircles.net/2009dec20/muslim_forum_telangana_demands_immediate_formation_state.html (Accessed on 6th May 2011)
- ¹²⁵ See SKC, 2010,p.300
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